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The advance of tort principles into the traditional realm of contract
law is most dramatic in the field of insurance law. The insurance
policy has long been viewed as the ultimate contract, entitled to the
utmost judicial respect, if not admiration. Carefully drafted by law-
yers knowledgeable in insurance law, honed to perfection by years
of stare decisis, with almost every paragraph regulated by statute,
one can understand the shock the insurance industry must experi-
ence as it views its castle walls crumbling, clause by clause.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars have been plagued by the problem of articulating a
concise all encompassing definition of the term insurance.2 Neverthe-
less, an insurance policy may be conservatively defined as a contract
wherein the rights and obligations of the insurer and insured are enu-
merated. The insurer, in exchange for the insured's payment of pre-
miums, is obligated to pay for losses of the insured upon the
happening of specified contingent events. The specified events in-
sured against, as well as the extent of the insurer's liability, are enu-
merated in the insurance policy. In the event of a dispute between the
1. John C. McCarthy, Plaintiffs View of Fire Cases, in EXTRACONTRACrUAL DAMAGES 71,
72 (John R. Groves ed., 1983).
2. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DocrImNs, AND COMMERCIAL PRAcncEs § 1.1(b) (student ed. 1988).
[Vol. 31:57
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insurer and the insured as to their rights and obligations under the
policy, contract rules of construction are traditionally applied.3 Like-
wise, contract rules have been traditionally applied in determining the
measure of damages in the event of a breach of the insurance contract.
Insurance contracts, unlike other private agreements, are unique
because they implicate important public policy concerns. Conse-
quently, the development of insurance principles and doctrines has
been influenced by judicial "perceptions about the interests of society
in the resolution of the dispute."4 These judicial perceptions led to the
development of extracontractual remedies for breach of the insurance
contract.
This article examines the development of extracontractual reme-
dies for the breach of first-party insurance contracts in Oklahoma.
Oklahoma's approach to extracontractual remedies in this area is sim-
ilar in many respects to that of California; however, it cannot be as-
sumed that a complete borrowing of rules, doctrines, and principles
has taken place. Rather, Oklahoma law reflects a number of novel
and unique approaches to such issues as standing to sue, liability of
agents and employees for extracontractual damages, and punitive
awards. These issues, as well as others, will be discussed and com-
pared throughout this article.
II. FrRsT-PARTY INSURANCE
First-party insurance refers to insurance policies under which the
insurer contracts to pay the policy proceeds directly to the insured.5
The policy involves only two parties, the insured and insurer; conse-
quently, when covered losses occur the insured makes the claim. As
stated in Zephyr Park, Ltd. v. Superior Court.6
The policy is written to protect the owner or beneficiary of the pol-
icy, who is termed a "first party." If the owner of the policy con-
cludes the insurance company has not complied with the terms of
the policy or has engaged in unfair settlement practices, the claim he
brings against the insurance company is termed a "first party" claim.
Where the insurance is a liability policy, the protection afforded the
3. 13 JoHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcC § 7381
(rev. ed. 1976).
4. KEETON & Wmiss, supra note 2, § 6A(a).
5. Clearwater v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 792 P.2d 719, 721 (Ariz. 1990).
6. 262 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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owner is its provision for indemnification against claims of third
parties for whose damage the insured is for some reason liable.
7
The award of extracontractual remedies in first-party insurance
actions can be traced to third-party insurance actions. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin has been credited with being among the first
American tribunals to impose extracontractual liability on third-party
insurers.8 In Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co.,9 the plain-
tiff/insured sought to "recover the excess over the [policy limit] of an
automobile indemnity policy which [the plaintiff] paid to satisfy a
judgment for damages imposed when his automobile struck a child."' 0
The policy gave the defendant/insurer full control to handle and adjust
all liability claims made against the insured." In addition, the policy
provided that the insured "shall not interfere in any negotiations for
settlement or any legal procedure. 1 2 The defendant's exercise of its
right to control the litigation resulted in judgments against the plaintiff
for $10,500.13 Plaintiff paid the judgments and subsequently filed an
action to recover $5,500 - the amount in excess of the policy limit.'4
At trial, the jury found that the defendant could have settled the
case before and during trial for an amount less than $5,000.15 Addi-
tionally, it found that the insurance company had acted "in bad faith
toward the plaintiff" in three respects: (1) in failing to make settle-
ments, (2) in its manner of handling the claims, and (3) in dealing with
its insured.' 6 In affirming the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, the
court focused on the relationship between the parties. That relation-
ship, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin determined, was tantamount to
7. Id. at 107 n.2. "The elemental right accruing to any insured under a first-party policy is
the right to be paid. To be sure, other persons and entities may sue under first-party policies, but
the rights to be enforced at common law are those of the insured." DENNis I. WALL, LrroA-
71ON AND PREVENTON oF INSURER BAD FArrH § 9.01, at 385 (2d ed. 1994).
Examples of first-party insurance policies include: life insurance; medical and disability in-
surance; health and accident insurance; title insurance; property damage insurance; lost income
insurance; fire insurance; and other types of policies providing for payment of proceeds directly
to the insured. Id at 384.
8. Id. at 386.
9. 231 N.W. 257 (Wis. 1930), reh'g granted, 235 N.W. 413 (Wis. 1931).
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principal and agent.'7 Therefore, the insurance company had a duty
to act in good faith toward its insured.'"
Upon rehearing, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin attempted to
clarify the type of duty which indemnity companies owe to their in-
sureds when making settlements. 19 The court observed that while the
contract itself created no express duty, one is implied from the rela-
tionship existing between the parties.20 Thus, because the insurance
company contracted for full control of the matter, its decisions must
be honest, intelligent, and informed "if it [is to] be a good faith conclu-
sion."'" A good faith conclusion is determined by examining whether
the indemnity insurer exercised "such diligence as the great majority
of persons use in the same or similar circumstances. This is ordinary
care."
2
The Hilker opinions were significant steps in the evolution from
the traditional contract approach to a breach by an insurer of an insur-
ance policy. The court's reference to an implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing, measured by a standard of ordinary care, established
a foundation for the application of tort principles in first-party insur-
ance cases.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF ExT.ACONRACrUAL REMEDIES FOR
BREACH OF INSURANCE CoNTRACrs
A. Unique Nature of Insurance Contracts
The development of extracontractual remedies for breach of in-
surance contracts resulted from a growing appreciation that insurance
contracts are not ordinary commercial agreements, and that principles
of contract law are totally inadequate where an insured has been
wrongfully denied an insurance claim or otherwise deprived of the
benefits of the insurance policyP3 Insurance contracts differ from or-
dinary commercial agreements in several important respects. The first
17. Id. at 259.
18. Id. at 261.
19. See Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 235 N.W. 413 (Wis. 1931). At least two lines of
authority existed in Wisconsin with regard t6 the duty owed by indemnity companies. One line
of authority was of the view that indemnity companies could only be held liable for negligent
conduct, while the other line held that liability would only follow when the companies' conduct
or lack of conduct amounted to bad faith. Id. at 414.
20. Id. at 416.
21. Id. at 415.
22. Id.
23. See VLRuAM M. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FArTH LITIGATION § 1,01, at 1-2
(1994).
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and most obvious distinction is that an insurance policy is a contract of
adhesion.' The second major distinction is that insurance contracts
are more personal than ordinary commercial contracts; the insured
enters into such contracts for peace of mind and financial security,
rather than economic gain.25 Given that personal nature, emphasis is
often placed on the reasonable expectation of the insured.26 Finally,
the insurance industry has undertaken to provide a service which af-
fects the public interest. As a result, such contracts are viewed as a
quasi-public industry- a proper subject for intense legislative and ju-
dicial regulation and scrutiny.27
24. An adhesion contract is often described as a contract in which one party has a consider-
able bargaining advantage over the other in its formation. As early as 1943 Professor Friedrich
Kessler noted:
Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong bargaining power. The
weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a position to shop
around for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract has a mo-
nopoly.., or because all competitors use the same clauses. His contractual intention is
but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms
whose consequences are often understood only in a vague way, if at all. Thus standard-
ized contracts are frequently contracts of adhesion.
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesiow Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. Rv. 629, 632 (1943). Creation of the term "adhesion contract" has been credited to
an article written by Edwin W. Patterson, who observed that the insurance contract "is drawn up
by the insurer and the insured, who merely adheres to it, has little choice as to its terms." Edwin
W. Patterson, The Delivery of A Life Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198,222 (1919). For a
detailed discussion of the nature of adhesion contracts see SHmRNOFF ET AL., supra note 23,
§ 1.03; PAUL J. SKOK, TRIAL ATToRNEY's GUIDE TO INSURANCE COVERAGE AND BAD FAITH
§ 7.2 (1994). See also Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, 756 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Okla. 1988) (defining
"adhesion contract").
25. SKOK, supra note 24, § 7.2, at 306-07. See also Johnson Transfer & Freight Lines, Inc. v.
American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 79 S.W.2d 587, 590 (Tenn. 1935) (stating "all insurance contracts
are personal in nature").
26. KEETON & WiDiss, supra note 2, § 6.3(a)(3)-(a)(4), at 630-36.
27. See 2A GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 21.1 (2d ed.
1984); 19 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 10321
(1982); Matthew 0. Tobriner & Joseph R. Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enter-
prise in the New Industrial State, 55 CAL L. REV. 1247, 1249 (1967). The public nature of the
insurance industry is best described in the following often cited quote: "The insurer's obligations
are ... rooted in their status as purveyors of a vital service labeled quasi-public in nature. Sup-
pliers of services affected with a public interest must take the public interest seriously, where
necessary placing it before their interest in maximizing gains and limiting disbursements." Egan
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452, 457 (Cal. 1979) (quoting William M. Goodman &
Thom G. Seaton, Foreword- Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings and Current Concerns of the
California Supreme Court, 62 CAL. L. REV. 309, 346-47 (1974)).
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B. Inadequacy of Contract Measure of Damages
Compensation is the primary objective in measuring damages in
both contract and tort law.28 However, the development of the mea-
sure of damages applicable to ex contractu and ex delicto actions
originates from the interests sought to be protected and the purpose
of the compensation of the respective action.29 Contract law seeks to
protect a consensual relationship, that being performance of the
promises.3 0 The law of torts however, developed to protect individu-
als from culpable interferences with person and property. Addition-
ally, tort theories of liability were influenced by public policy and not
necessarily by the will or intention of the parties.3 ' The primary aim
in measuring damages in contract actions is to place the non-breach-
ing party in the same position he would have been in had the agree-
ment been performed by awarding a sum equivalent to performance.32
In contrast, tort law aims to award the plaintiff enough money to re-
store him, as nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in
had the wrong not occurred. 33 In essence, tort law seeks to compen-
sate the plaintiff for a loss sustained rather than to give him the bene-
fit of his bargain.'
Prior to the recognition of tort liability, a breach of an insurance
contract was treated as an ordinary contract action to which courts
traditionally applied the rule of foreseeability developed in Hadley v.
Baxendale.35 A non-breaching party could recover for breach of con-
tract only that amount "as may fairly and reasonably be considered
either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things,
from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be sup-
posed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time
they made the contract. '36
28. 1 TiODORE SED-WICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES §§ 29,30,37 (9th
ed. 1912).
29. 2 SEDGWiCK, supra note 28, §§ 141, 602.
30. W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 656
(5th ed. 1984).
31. Id.
32. 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 992 (1964); CHARLES T. McCoRMICK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 137 (1935); 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1338 (3rd ed. 1968 & Supp. 1980).
33. MCCORMICK, supra note 32, § 137.
34. 2 SEDGWICK, supra note 28, § 602.
35. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
36. Id. at 151.
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As applied to insurance contracts, the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale
was construed to restrict an insured's recovery for breach of an insur-
ance policy to the policy limits, plus any damages foreseeable or con-
templated by the parties at the time the contract was made.37 Even
though consequential damages arose "naturally" from the breach, the
contract measure precluded their recovery because they were viewed
as too unforeseeable and remote.3 8 Recoverable consequential dam-
ages were fixed at the time the contract was made; thus, a subsequent
willful breach could not "affect the damages, the measure of which
was fixed at that time. 39
The inadequacy of the contract measure of damages for breach of
an insurance policy was most evident in cases where the insurer re-
fused to settle a claim within policy limits.4 0 As a consequence of this
refusal, the insured was exposed to liability in excess of the policy lim-
its. Under the contract theory of recovery, the insured was not enti-
tled to recover the amount of the excess liability from the insurer
because the policy established the limits of the insurer's liability. 1
C. Recognition of Extracontractual Remedies for Breach of
Contract
Recognition of the economic and social policies inherent in the
business of insurance, the unique nature of the insurance contract, and
37. Id Even though the rule in Hadley has received severe criticism it is uniformly followed
throughout the United States. The American Law Institute incorporated the rule as § 330 of the
RFSTATEMENT OF Co-rTAcrs which provides:
In awarding damages, compensation is given for only those injuries that the de-
fendant had reason to foresee as a probable result of his breach when the contract was
made. If the injury is one that follows the breach in the usual course of events, there is
sufficient reason for the defendant to foresee it; otherwise, it must be shown specifically
that the defendant had reason to know the facts and to foresee the injury.
RESTATEMENT OF CoNTmAmCS § 330 (1932).
38. Underlying the traditional "rationale offered by courts in denying recovery for conse-
quential damages in breach of insurance cases was the notion that the relationship between
insureds and insurers is essentially commercial. See Harlach v. Metro Property & Liab. Ins. Co.,
602 A.2d 1007, 1009 (Conn. 1992). Cf. Copesky v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338, 341 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452, 457 (Cal. 1979).
One early common law exception to this general principle of contract arose where the na-
ture and object of the contract was personal, rather than commercial in nature. The non-breach-
ing party in such a contract was entitled to recover compensatory damages. See, e.g., Stewart v.
Rudner, 84 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich. 1957); Hood v. Moffett, 69 So. 664, 666 (Miss. 1915).
39. Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 547 (1903). See Thomas A.
Diamond, The Tort Of Bad Faith Breach Of Contract: When, If At All, Should It Be Extended
Beyond Insurance Transactions, 64 MARo. L. REv. 425, 433-34 (1981).
40. See Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 235 N.W. 413, 414-15 (Wis. 1931). See generally
Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 43 A. 503 (Me. 1899); Wisconsin Zinc Co. v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 155 N.W. 1081, 1083 (Wis. 1916).
41. See e.g., Rumford Falls, 43 A. at 503; Wisconsin Zinc Co., 155 N.W. at 1085.
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the inadequacy of traditional contract remedies caused courts to em-
phasize the special relationship between the parties when analyzing
disputes over the denial of coverage or policy benefits.4' In this rela-
tionship, insurers ordinarily possess superior economic power, bar-
gaining position, and subject matter sophistication.43 Judicial
appreciation of these aspects of insurance contracts served as the
foundation for imposition of extracontractual liability on insurers for
breach of their duty to act fairly and in good faith.' Simultaneously
with recognition of the special relationship between insurers and their
insureds, courts began applying tort principles to disputes between
said parties.45 Currently five distinct tort theories of recovery have
developed: (1) breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing, (2) implied statutory cause of action, (3) fraud, (4) intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and (5) tortious interference with a
protected property interest. Each of these tort theories will be dis-
cussed below.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF TORT LIABILITY FOR INSURANCE
CoNTRAcrs
A. The Tort of Bad Faith: Breach of the Implied Duty of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing
1. Recognition of the Tort of Bad Faith
Every contract of insurance contains an obligation to act in good
faith in the performance of the duties expressly set out in the con-
tract.46 Each insurance contract also contains the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing. Much of the confusion surrounding the availa-
bility of extracontractual remedies for breach of insurance contracts
surround the tautological confusion between these two, distinct, obli-
gations in the insurance contract.47
42. See CoucH, supra note 27, § 23.11.
43. SHmEN'oFF ET AT, supra note 23, § 1.03.
44. Id.
45. See e.g., Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866,867-68 (Ariz. 1981); Hoskins
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1316 (Ohio 1983).
46. See RiSTAsrmrENT (SEcoND) OF CoTRn~crs § 205 (1973) ("Every contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.").
47. Early on, courts recognized that tautological confusion surrounds the issue of extracon-
tractual liability for breach of insurance contracts. Much of this confusion
springs from none too critical use of terms. Terms which are not strictly convertible or
synonymous have been used by different courts to indicate the same thing.... Bad
faith, especially, is a term of variable significance and rather broad application. Gener-
ally speaking, good faith means being faithful to one's duty or obligation; bad faith
means being recreant thereto.
9
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Extracontractual remedies are not available for simple breach of
contract. Rather, such remedies are available only where a fiduciary,
or other analogous relationship, is found to exist between the con-
tracting parties.4 8 A fiduciary relationship between the insurer and
insured is crucial to the existence of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing-the breach of which constitutes the tort of bad faith.4 9
Currently forty-seven jurisdictions,"° including Oklahoma, recognize
the extracontractual remedy of bad faith in first-party insurance
actions.
California was the first jurisdiction to recognize the tort of bad
faith for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in
first-party insurance contracts. The principle case in that jurisdiction,
Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,5s considered whether a plaintiff
stated a viable cause of action by alleging that an insurance company
had breached its duty to plaintiff by failing to wait to resolve a fire
Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 235 N.W. 413, 414 (Wis. 1931). The terms good faith and bad
faith emanate from contract law. The law of contract recognized that the terms meant different
things in different contexts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 600, 603
(9th Cir. 1988); DeVries v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 716 F.2d 939, 942-43 (1st Cir. 1983);
Grant v. Transit Casualty Co., 693 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
48. Courts initially rejected the notion that a fiduciary relationship existed between insurers
and their insureds. See WALL, supra note 7, § 9.03. The traditional view was summed up as
follows:
As a general rule, the relation[ship] between the parties to a contract of insurance
is that of debtor and creditor, that is, of one contracting party to another contracting
party, rather than of trustee and cestui que trust, or such as would arise by virtue of a
will or other testamentary instrument.
CoucH, supra note 27, § 23.11. The above cited treatise recognized the change in the traditional
view and added:
However, insurance policies are contracts of the utmost good faith and must be
administered and performed as such by the insurer. Good faith demands that the in-
surer deal with laymen as laymen and not as experts in the subtleties of law and under-
writing. Particularly where the language expressing the extent of the coverage may be
deceptive to the ordinary layman, there is an implied covenant in insurance contracts of
good faith and fair dealing that the insurer will not do anything to injure the rights of its
policyholder to recover the benefits of his contract.
Id. See also Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452,455-56 (Cal. 1979). But cf. Ameri-
can Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Jones Trucking Co., 321 P.2d 685 (Okla. 1957); National Mut.
Casualty Co. v. Britt, 200 P.2d 407, 411 (Okla. 1948). In these third-party insurance cases the
Oklahoma courts relied on an agency type relationship to support the implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing.
49. WALL, supra note 7, § 9.03, at 389. "Unless rights are given up to one person to act on
behalf of another, there is no fiduciary relation. If there is no fiduciary relation, there can be no
fiduciary bad faith." Id.
It has been suggested that the same result has been achieved in several states by recognizing
an implied contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 390. See also Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362, 364-65 (Okla. 1984) (stating that the duty arises from the contractual
relationship between the insurer and insured). This relationship is viewed as fiduciary in nature.
50. See SHEmRNOFF ET AL, supra note 23, § 1.01, at 1-2 n.3.
51. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
10
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insurance claim until after the plaintiff, who was charged with arson,
had resolved the criminal matter."2 According to the court, the duty
alluded to by the plaintiff "sounds in both contract and tort,"53 and "is
imposed because there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in every contract [including insurance policies] that neither
party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to re-
ceive the benefits of the agreement." 4 The court held that, by refus-
ing to wait until the criminal action was adjudicated to settle the
insurance claim, the insurance company had forced plaintiff to choose
between protecting his rights in the criminal matter and negotiating
his insurance settlement.5 5 Such a choice denied the plaintiff the ben-
efits of his insurance contract.56 The court found for the plaintiff, and
imposed extracontractual liability on the insurer, not for a bad faith
breach of the contract, but for failure to satisfy the implied covenant
derived from tort law.57
The implied covenant imposes upon first-party insurers a duty be-
yond that mandated by the express terms of the insurance policy.58
By refusing without proper cause to compensate for a covered loss, an
52. Id. at 1035. Plaintiff's cocktail lounge and restaurant was insured against fire loss by
Aetna Insurance Company, Yosemite Insurance Company and American Home Assurance
Company. Id. When a fire occurred at Plaintiff's establishment, he argued with a member of the
arson detail and was arrested. Id. The insurance company contacted a claims adjuster who in-
vestigated the fire and inspected the premises. Id. While at the premises, the adjuster stated to
an arson investigator that plaintiff had excess coverage under his fire insurance policies. Id.
Plaintiff was subsequently charged with arson. Id. While these charges were pending, the
insurance companies demanded plaintiff appear at the office of counsel to submit documents and
be examined under oath. 1d. Plaintiff's attorney responded that his client would not make any
statements about the fire until the criminal matter was concluded: Id. at 1035. Thereafter, a
preliminary hearing was held on charges of arson and defrauding the insurer. Id. The charges
were ultimately dismissed for lack of probable cause. Id. Plaintiff soon thereafter informed
counsel for the insurance companies that he would submit to an examination. Id. The insurers
however, reaffirmed their earlier position that they were denying liability because of plaintiff's
earlier refusal to submit to examination. Id.
53. Id. at 1036 (citing Comunale Traders & General Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1037.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1038 (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 174 (Cal. 1967)). "[T]he
violation of that duty sounds in tort notwithstanding that it may also constitute a breach of
contract." Id. (quoting Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 174 (Cal. 1967)).
58.
That responsibility is not the requirement mandated by the terms of the policy itself-
to defend, settle, or pay. It is the obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law, under
which the insurer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging its contractual respon-
sibilities. Where in so doing, it fails to deal fairly and in good faith with its insured by
refusing, without proper cause, to compensate its insured for loss covered by the policy,
such conduct may give rise to a cause of action in tort for breach of an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.
Id. 1037.
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insurance company may face tort liability if it deals unfairly and in bad
faith with its insured. In first-party cases the standard for determining
whether extracontractual liability for bad faith should be granted
under Gruenberg and cases following it is whether the insurer was
"unreasonable" in handling the insured's claim by denying the pro-
ceeds for a covered loss to the insured without proper cause.5 9 Bad
motive, subjective intent to cause harm, or a conscious awareness that
the conduct is unjustifiable is not required to satisfy the Gruenberg
standard. 60 Liability for bad faith does not exist, however, when an
insurer's denial of coverage is based upon a reasonable interpretation
of the policy language.6'
The distinction between the contractual obligation of good faith
and fair dealing and the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing is perhaps most significant in one other important respect. The
implied covenant, because it sounds in tort, is not conditioned upon
whether the insured has fulfilled its obligations under the policy. "In
other words, the insurer's duty is unconditional and independent of
the performance of plaintiff's contractual obligations. This duty is in-
dependent of the contract and attaches over and above the terms of
the contract." 62 The insurer's implied duty is a single63 "absolute
one."'  The insured's breach of contract claim is distinct from the bad
faith claim; consequently, whether the insured satisfied its contractual
obligations is relevant only in the breach of contract component of the
case.
65
2. Oklahoma's Recognition of the Tort of Bad Faith
In Christian v. American Home Assurance Co.,6 6 the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma officially recognized the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in a first-party insurance action involving disabil-
ity insurance. The court expressly adopted the standard for bad faith
established in Gruenberg and held that the "violation of the duty gives
rise to an action in tort for which consequential and, in a proper case,
59. ld. "Accordingly, when the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of
the claim of its insured, it is subject to liability in tort." Id. at 1038.
60. See McCormick v. Sentinel Life Ins. Co., 200 Cal. Rptr. 732, 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
61. See Hillman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Alaska 1993).
62. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1040 (Cal. 1973).
63. There is but one duty to act fairly and in good faith. Id. at 1037. Specific statements of
this duty are merely different characterizations of the same duty. Id.
64. Id. at 1040.
65. See id.; White v. Uniguard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 1020 (Idaho 1986); Anderson v.
Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Wis. 1978).
66. 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
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punitive, damages may be sought."'67 Since Christian, the implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing has been expanded to cover all types of
insurance contracts.68
a. Standing to Sue
An insurer's liability for bad faith does not extend to every indi-
vidual entitled to the insurance proceeds. Rather, the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing extends only to those persons sharing a
contractual or statutory relationship with the insurer.69 In other
words, only individuals in a contractual or statutory relationship with
the insurer have standing to sue for bad faith. The rationale underly-
ing this rule is that "[i]n the absence of a contractual or statutory rela-
tionship, there is no duty which can be breached. '70
In the vast majority of cases, the answer to whether a contractual
or statutory relationship exists will inevitably be obvious. However,
the question is not always clear. For example, in Roach v. Atlas Life
Insurance Co.,7 the Oklahoma Supreme Court was presented with
the question of whether a life insurance beneficiary was entitled to
assert a bad faith claim. The court recognized that a third person to
whom life insurance proceeds are payable is a third-party benefici-
ary72 and an intended party to the contract. Likewise, Oklahoma stat-
utory law recognizes the right of third-party beneficiaries, prior to
67. Id. at 904. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma's use of the words "in a proper case, puni-
tive damages may be sought" was an intentional attempt to qualify the recovery of punitive
damages in bad faith cases. See McCorkle v. Great Atlantic Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 587-88
(Okla. 1981).
68. Id. at 587. See also Whitson v. Oklahoma Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 889 P.2d 285,
287 (Okla. 1995) (employer's liability to an injured insured worker is limited to that created by
§ 12 of the workers' compensation act); Goodwin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 431, 432
(Okla. 1992) (holding that a "workers' compensation insurance company [can] be subject to tort
liability for a willful, malicious and bad faith refusal to pay an employee's workers compensation
[benefits]."). But cf. Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, 765 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Okla. 1988) (holding that
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed upon contract of insurance would not be
extended to commercial contracts).
69. Goodwin, 828 P.2d at 432-33; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362,364 (Okla. 1984);
Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 911 (Okla. 1982). See also Townsend v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 236,237 (Okla. 1993) (holding class two insured automobile
passenger has both a contractual and statutory relationship with insurer); Roach v. Atlas Life
Ins. Co., 769 P.2d 158, 161 (Okla. 1989) (finding third party beneficiary status).
70. Amick, 680 P.2d at 364. See also Gianfillippo v. Northland Casualty Co., 861 P.2d 308,
310 (Okla. 1993).
71. 769 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1989).
72. Id. at 161.
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rescission, to enforce any contract made for their benefit. 73 Conse-
quently, the beneficiary of a life insurance contract satisfies both crite-
rion for an assertion of a bad faith claim.74
b. Liability of Insurer for Conduct of Agents and
Employees
An agent of the insurer or any other third party who is a "stran-
ger to the contract" may not be held liable for bad faith conduct.75
Nonetheless, the agent's conduct may be relevant in determining
whether a breach of the duty owed by the insurer has occurred. For
example, an insurance company employing an independent contractor
cannot avoid liability for its breach because the insurer's duty of good
faith and fair dealing is nondelegable. 76 In Wolf v. Prudential Insur-
ance Co. of America,77 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the rule prohibiting bad
faith claims against agents and third parties was without exception.
The court observed that Prudential, the administrator of the insurance
plan, (1) was primarily responsible for investigating and servicing
claims, (2) played a role in determining whether benefits would be
paid, (3) received a percentage of the premiums paid, and (4) as losses
decreased, Prudential's share of the premiums increased. 78 Based on
the nature of the arrangement and the extensive functions performed
by Prudential, the court concluded that a special relationship existed
between Prudential, the agent/administrator, and the insured.79 As
observed by Judge Ebel, the author of the opinion:
The contractual obligation [of Prudential] combines with the fact
that Prudential's benefit determinations could at least indirectly af-
fect its profits and losses to create a special relationship between
Prudential and plaintiffs. In other words, on the facts as presented
by plaintiffs, Prudential had the power, motive and opportunity to
act unscrupulously. We believe the Oklahoma Supreme Court
73. Id. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 29 (1991) provides that "[a] contract, made expressly for the
benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind
it."
74. Roach, 769 P.2d at 161.
75. Allstate Ins. Co., v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362, 364-65 (Okla. 1984). See also Timmons v.
Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 912-13 (Okla. 1982) (citing Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co., 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979)).
76. 77mmons, 653 P.2d at 914.
77. 50 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995).
78. Id. at 797-98.
79. Id. at 798.
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would impose a duty of good faith on an entity in Prudential's posi-
tion for the same reasons it imposes the duty on "true" insurers.8 0
The Wolf opinion intimates that an exception to the general pro-
hibition against asserting bad faith against agents exists where there is
a special relationship between the agent and insured. This special re-
lationship arises out of the contractual obligations of the agent to the
insurance company. Consequently, agents may be treated as the in-
surer where they perform significant functions generally reserved to
insurance companies and possess a pecuniary interest tied to the risks
insured against.
3. Insurer's Right to Dispute Claim
In Oklahoma, bad faith is treated as an intentional tort, the es-
sence of which is the insurer's unreasonable and bad faith conduct.81
Consequently, an insurer's mere resort to a judicial forum, regardless
of outcome, is not per se bad faith. Rather, the plaintiff must show
that, under the circumstances of the case, there was no legitimate dis-
pute surrounding its claim when the insurer instituted the legal pro-
ceeding.s2 For example, in Manis v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.8 3 the
plaintiff, owner of a bar which was damaged by fire, brought a bad
faith action against his insurer who refused to pay the total amount of
coverage.8 4 The insurer withheld payment because: (1) there was
strong evidence that the fire was incendiary in nature, (2) there was
circumstantial evidence that suggested that plaintiff had motive, and
(3) the plaintiff was under suspicion by the Oklahoma State Bureau of
Investigations for arson. 5 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed
the award of punitive damages to the plaintiff noting that:
The defendant's actions were reasonable and legitimate. Facts were
in dispute as to the cause of the fire. The insurers had a right to
have this dispute settled in a judicial forum. A Christian cause of
action will not lie where there is a legitimate dispute.... Insurance
companies have the right to dispute a claim in good faith.86
80. Id. (citing Christian v. American Home Assurance, 577 P.2d 899, 902-04 (Okla. 1977)).
81. See McCorkle v. Great Atlantic Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 587 (Okla. 1981).
82. Id. See also Ballinger v. Security Connecticut Life Ins. Co., 862 P.2d 68,70 (Okla. 1993);
McCoy v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 841 P.2d 568, 570 (Okla. 1992).
83. 681 P.2d 760 (Okla. 1984). See also Conti v. Republic Underwriters Ins. Co., 782 P.2d
1357, 1359 (Okla. 1989).
84. Manis, 681 P.2d at 761.
85. Id. at 761-62.
86. Id. at 762.
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Reasonableness becomes a question for the trier of fact to deter-
mine where reasonable minds might draw different inferences as to
the reasonableness of an insurer's conduct? Oklahoma seemingly
applies an objective standard, and asks whether the insurer's denial or
dispute of the claim was legitimate.88 This fact intensive question is
answered on the basis of how a reasonable insurer would have acted
under the facts and circumstances of the case. Whether the insurer's
denial or dispute of the claim is legitimate raises the issue of whether
the facts necessary to evaluate the claim were properly investigated,
recorded, and acted upon or recklessly ignored.8 9
The manner in which the claim is evaluated is also important, be-
cause the insurer's alleged bad faith decision will be examined in light
of the circumstances and information possessed by the insurer at the
time the decision to deny coverage was made.90 Events arising, or
information obtained thereafter, are irrelevant and will not be consid-
ered in deciding the reasonableness of the insurer's decision. 91
4. Culpability and Damages
Though viewed as an intentional tort, bad faith is actually a hy-
brid tort. Therefore, a distinction must be drawn between the level of
culpability or fault which will support a compensatory damage award
with that which will support a punitive damage award.9 It is uni-
formly agreed that a higher degree of culpability is required to sup-
port a punitive award than is needed to support a compensatory
award.93 The Gruenberg standard, however, does not require the in-
sured to prove that its insurer's conduct was the result of bad motive,
subjective intent to cause harm, or conscious awareness that its con-
duct was unjustified in order to prove bad faith for purposes of recov-
ering compensatory damages. Rather, all that is required is evidence
87. Conti, 782 P.2d at 1360-61 (citing McCorkle v. Great Atlantic Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583,587
(Okla. 1981)).
88. See McCoy v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 841 P.2d 568, 570 (Okla. 1992);
Manis, 681 P.2d at 762.
89. See McCoy, 841 P.2d at 570; Tmimons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co, 653 P.2d 907, 907 (Okla.
1982).
90. Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Okla. 1991). "The action of the [in-
surance] company must be assessed in light of all facts known or knowable concerning the claim
at the time plaintiff requested the company to perform its contractual obligation." Conti, 782 P.2d
at 1362 (citing Buzzard v. McDaniels, 736 P.2d 157, 159 (Okla. 1987)).
91. Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d at 1109.
92. Id. at 1115; Timmons, 653 P.2d at 918.
93. Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d at 1115; Timmons, 653 P.2d at 918.
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of an unreasonable denial of a covered loss without proper cause.94
Although Oklahoma courts have adopted the Gruenberg standard of
bad faith for the purposes of awarding compensatory damages, it has
retained its traditional standard for determining whether punitive
damages should be awarded.95
In Oklahoma, punitive damages may not be awarded in the ab-
sence of actual damages. 96 As a result of the actual damages require-
ment, the insured must prevail on the bad faith breach of contract
claim in order to recover punitive damages. 97 The standard for the
recovery of punitive damages in a tort action in Oklahoma requires
that:
[T]he proof must show some elements of fraud, malice or oppres-
sion. The act which constitutes the cause of action must be actuated
by or accompanied with some evil intent, or must be the result of
gross negligence-such disregard of another's rights-as is deemed
equivalent to such intent .... Exemplary damages are allowed only
in cases where fraud, oppression, gross negligence or malice, actual
or presumed, enter into the cause of action, but a person may com-
mit such villful acts in reckless disregard of another's rights that
malice may be inferred.98
The court must determine that the record shows clear and con-
vincing evidence of the insurance company's wanton or reckless disre-
gard for the rights of another, oppression, fraud, or malice prior to
submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury.99
5. Standards for Determining Bad Faith
The Gruenberg standard, which focuses on the unreasonableness
of the insurer's conduct as a condition precedent to a punitive dam-
ages award, is said to be the minority view.100 The majority view was
94. Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1038.
95. 7immons, 653 P.2d at 918-19. See also McLaughlin v. National Beneficial Life Ins. Co.
which stated:
Our [the Oklahoma Supreme Court's] recognition of the standard stated in Oden v.
Russell as applicable in Timmons may only be read to indicate that the question of
proof necessary to sustain a claim for punitive damages in a bad faith dealing case
involving an insurance company is the same standard as necessary to sustain such a
claim in any case where punitive damages are sought under 23 O.S. 1981 § 9.
McLaughlin v. National Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 772 P.2d 383, 387 (Okla. 1988). Oklahoma's
standard for punitive damages has been codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1991).
96. Moore v. Metropolitan Utils. Co., 477 P.2d 692, 694 (Okla. 1970).
97. Manis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 760, 762 (Okla. 1984). See also McCorkle v.
Great Atlantic Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 587 (Okla. 1981).
98. Slocum v. Phillips Petroleum Club, 678 P.2d 716, 718 (Okla. 1983).
99. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1991).
100. SKOiK, supra note 24, §§ 7.14 - .15.
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developed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Anderson v. Conti-
nental Insurance Co.'01 In Anderson, the plaintiffs/insureds were own-
ers of a home insured by Continental Insurance Company. 02 While
the policy was in effect, a fire or explosion in a furnace occurred which
caused oil and smoke residue to settle on the walls, clothing, furniture,
draperies, and carpeting of the plaintiffs.10 3 Continental was notified
of the loss and delegated Underwriters Adjusting Company to handle
the claim.104 Underwriters employed cleaners who attempted to clean
and renovate the premises.0 5 However, it was necessary for plaintiffs
to repaint, clean, restore the premises, and replace the carpets.0 6
Plaintiffs alleged $4,611.77 in monetary loss. 10 7 Plaintiffs sought to ne-
gotiate with Underwriters and Continental Insurance Company.108
Continental refused to negotiate on the amount of the claim, made
very low settlement offers, and refused to accept the plaintiffs' sworn
proof of loss statements. 0 9 Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit for bad
faith." 0
In Anderson, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin identified the con-
tours of bad faith as follows: "[t]o show a claim for bad faith, a plain-
tiff must show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits
of the policy and the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of
the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.""' This standard
concentrates on the intentional nature of the insurer's conduct and
requires at least some conscious awareness of the lack of a reasonable
basis for denial of the claim. In addition, this conscious awareness
"may be inferred and imputed to an insurance company where there is
a reckless disregard of a lack of a reasonable basis for denial or a
reckless indifference to facts or to proofs submitted by the insured."112
The insurer's reckless disregard in Anderson was manifested in its re-
fusal "to consider the nature and extent of the plaintiffs' damages, and
101. 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).









111. Id. at 376.
112. Id. at 377.
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specifically rejected and spumed the opportunity to evaluate and con-
sider the submitted proof of loss."'1 13
The Anderson standard is clearly more stringent than the.
Gruenberg standard. However, a subsequent opinion of the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court, Fehring v. Republic Insurance Co.,1 4 has dimin-
ished the distinction between the two standards. In Fehring, the court
held that bad faith could be established by proof "that a reasonable
insurer under the circumstances would not have acted as [the insurer]
did by delaying payment of the claim and by offering amounts which
are alleged to be unreasonably low."' 5 However, courts in states
which have adopted the Anderson standard continue to require a
more conscious or intentional wrongdoing on the part of the insurer
than is necessary under Gruenberg.16
6. Prima Facie Case Requirements
The first-party insured carries the burden of proof on all aspects
of the bad faith claim. 1 7 The insured must also plead and prove that
it has performed all conditions precedent, together with all the other
113. Id.
114. 347 N.W.2d 595 (Wis. 1984).
115. Id. at 601.
116. See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769 (Neb. 1991). The Anderson standard of
care, which requires intentional or reckless conduct on the part of the insurer, strikes the proper
balance between the respective rights of the insurer and the policyholder. Id. at 778. See also
National Sec. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bowen, 417 So. 2d 179, 183 (Ala. 1982) which states:
The plaintiff in a "bad faith refusal" case has the burden of proving:
(a) an insurance contract between the parties and a breach thereof by the defendant;
(b) an intentional refusal to pay the insured's claim;
(c) the absence of any reasonably legitimate or arguable reason for that refusal (the
absence of a debatable reason);
(d) the insurer's actual knowledge of the absence of any legitimate or arguable reason;
(e) if intentional failure to determine the existence of a lawful basis is relied upon, the
plaintiff must prove the insurer's intentional failure to determine whether there is a
legitimate or arguable reason to refuse to pay the claim.
Id. at 183. See also Allison v. Security Benefit Life Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 1213, 1216 (8th Cir. 1992);
Lehman v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 806 F. Supp. 859, 864 (D. Ariz. 1992); SKOK, supra note
24, § 7.15, at 317.
117. The expressed elements required to be proven are:
1. The insurer was required under the policy to pay plaintiff's claim;
2. The insurer's refusal to pay the claim in full was unreasonable under the circum-
stances, because [for example, that 1) it did not perform a proper investigation, 2) it did
not evaluate the results of the investigation properly, 3) it has no reasonable basis for
the refusal, or 4) the amount offered to satisfy the claim was unreasonably low];
3. The insurer did not deal fairly and in good faith with plaintiff; and
4. The violation by the insurer of its duty of good faith and fair dealing was the direct
cause of the injury sustained by plaintiff.
OKLA. UNW. JURY INsTR. Cv 22.2 (1993).
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elements of the contract claim against the insurer. The burden there-
after shifts to the insurer to demonstrate that it had a legitimate or
reasonable basis for its denial or dispute of the claim.118
While the test for good faith varies from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion, courts throughout the country have always incorporated some
form of the reasonableness standard. For example, in a number of
jurisdictions a two-part test, referred to as the "fairly debatable" test,
is used to determine bad faith." 9 Under this test, insureds must prove
that: (1) the insurer's conduct was unreasonable; and (2) the insurer
intentionally denied a claim, or delayed payment of a claim that it
knew to be valid, or showed a reckless disregard of the fact that a
valid claim had been submitted.'2
In examining the reasonableness of the insurer's conduct, courts
are determining whether a reasonable insurer, under the facts and cir-
cumstances of the particular case, would have denied or delayed pay-
ment of the claim. In those jurisdictions that adhere to the two-part
test, the insured has the burden of proving the absence of a legitimate,
arguable or debatable reason for the denial or delay as part of its
prima facie case.'2' In contrast, Oklahoma law does not place the bur-
den on the insured to prove the absence of a legitimate, arguable or
fairly debatable reason for denial or delay. 22 Rather, the existence of
a legitimate reason is treated as a defense which must be proven by
the insurer.
a. The Dutton Rule
Although Oklahoma is among those jurisdictions that have either
expressly or impliedly adopted the rule that an insurer may deny a
claim without incurring liability if the denial was based on a legitimate
118. Manis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 760, 762 (Okla. 1984).
119. See e.g., Koch v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 565 So. 2d 226, 229 (Ala. 1990);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1272 (Colo. 1985); Morgan v. American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Iowa 1995).
120. Travelers, 706 P.2d at 1272.
121. National Sec. Fire and Casualty Co. v. Bowen, 417 So. 2d 179, 183 (Ala. 1982).
122. See Manis, 681 P.2d at 762. The court stated that "plaintiff failed to meet his burden of
proof." Id. This statement examined in context suggests that the plaintiff, by proving unreason-
ableness, automatically disproves the reasonableness of the insurer's decision or conduct. How-
ever, this might not always be the case because plaintiff in satisfying his burden will use only such
evidence as supports his positions. Consequently, it is left to the defendant to present such
evidence as might demonstrate the reasonableness of his decision or conduct. SKoK, supra note
24, at §§ 7.14-.15.
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or reasonable basis (i.e. in good faith),"z Oklahoma has not ad-
dressed the specific issue of whether an insurer that produces suffi-
cient evidence to create a jury issue on the question of coverage is
entitled to a dismissal or directed verdict on the bad faith claim. Nu-
merous jurisdictions have adopted the view that under such circum-
stances a legitimate, arguable or fairly debatable reason exists;
therefore, the bad faith claim should be dismissed despite the fact that
the jury may ultimately find for the insured on the coverage issue be-
cause "[w]here a claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to
debate it and there is no bad faith on its part in doing so."' 2 4 In juris-
dictions that have adopted this view, the insurer's production of suffi-
cient evidence to create a jury issue constitutes good faith as a matter
of law.1.5 A finding of good faith as a matter of law, during either the
pretrial or trial phase, entitles the insurance company to be granted a
motion for summary judgment or directed verdict, respectively.126
The maxim "good faith as a matter of law" has been traced to the
case of National Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Dutton.27 In Dutton,
the Alabama Supreme Court established the standard to be used in
determining whether the insurer had a reasonably debatable reason
for denying the claim. This standard dictates that where the evidence
produced by either side "creates a fact issue with regard to the validity
of the claim and thus, the legitimacy of the denial thereof, the [bad
faith] claim must fail."'1 Thus, in jurisdictions adhering to the Dutton
rule a bad faith claim should not be successful unless reasonable
minds could not differ as to the insured's right to receive the policy
proceeds and the court is prepared to enter a directed verdict for the
insured on the insurance contract claim.12 9 The Dutton rule places
upon the insured an extremely heavy burden of proof. However, the
rule is not absolute, and was not intended as an insurmountable bar-
rier to bad faith claims.'30
123. Manis, 681 P.2d at 762.
124. Dirks v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 857,861 (Iowa 1991). See also Douglas
G. Houser, Good Faith As A Matter Of Law: The Insurance Company's Right To Be Wrong, 27
TORT & INS. L. J. 665 (1992).
125. See eg., Reuter v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Iowa 1991);
Mills v. Regent Ins. Co., 449 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
126. See Morton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 486 So. 2d 1263, 1268 (Ala. 1986); Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Sims, 435 So. 2d 1219, 1224 (Ala. 1983).
127. 419 So. 2d 1357 (Ala. 1982). But cf. Jones v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Co.,
507 So. 2d 396, 401 (Ala. 1986) (recognizing an exception to the Dutton Rule).
128. Dutton, 419 So. 2d at 1362.
129. Morton, 486 So. 2d at 1268; Safeco, 435 So. 2d at 1224.
130. Jones, 507 So. 2d at 401.
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The "directed verdict [for the insured] on the contract claim"
component of the standard is "intended as an objective standard by
which to measure plaintiff's compliance with his burden of proving
that defendant's denial of payment was without any reasonable basis
either in fact or law.' 131 The "directed verdict on the contract claim"
standard has been adopted or used in thirty-six jurisdictions and ex-
pressly rejected in only three.132 Neither the Dutton rule nor the "di-
rected verdict on the contract claim" standard is applied in Oklahoma
to determine whether an insurer had a legitimate reason for his deci-
sion. Rather, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Conti v. Republic Un-
derwriters Insurance Co.,' 33 observed that:
If there is conflicting evidence as to the reasonableness of the
insurer's actions from which different inferences may be drawn,
"then what is reasonable is always a question to be determined by
the trier of fact by a consideration of the circumstances in each
case." This court does not attempt to weigh the evidence, but exam-
ines the record only to determine whether the evidence and permis-
sible inferences drawn therefrom reasonably sustain the jury's
verdict.' 3
The insurer's breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing may result from any one or more of the following: (1) im-
proper investigation; (2) failure to investigate, or inadequate investi-
gation; (3) fraudulent, intrusive or harassing investigative methods; (4)
deceptive practices; (5) intrusive practices; (6) failure to consider in-
formation submitted by the insured or insured's expert prior to deci-
sion; (7) failure to communicate grounds for denial; (8) failure to
communicate to the insured the procedure for reconsideration of a
decision to deny; and (9) unreasonable delay in payment or handling
of claim.13  Any unreasonable conduct engaged in without legitimate
reason will support a claim for bad faith. 36 However, the specific
conduct which gives rise to the breach of the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing is not in and of itself the duty owed. Rather, the
conduct represents a specific characterization of the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing.137 The implied duty of good faith and fair
131. Safeco, 435 So. 2d at 1224-25.
132. See Houser, supra note 124, at 669 & app. at 674-77 (listing jurisdictions that have
adopted or rejected this test).
133. 782 P.2d 1357 (Okla. 1989).
134. Id. at 1360-61 (quoting McCorkle v. Great Atlantic Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 587 (Okla.
1981)).
135. SERNioi' ET At., supra note 23, at § 5.03.
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dealing is the only duty the breach of which will support a claim for
bad faith. 3 ' The duty of good faith and fair dealing requires that an
insurer treat each insured's interest at least as equal to its own.'39
B. Implied Statutory Causes of Action
1. General Rule of Statutory Causes of Action
A majority of jurisdictions, including Oklahoma, that have ad-
dressed the issue of whether to recognize implied statutory actions
against first-party insurers, have responded in the negative. 40 Com-
mentators have postulated that the reasoning underlying this response
is best expressed in the judicial treatment of one or more of the four
traditional questions examined by courts in determining whether to
create a private cause of action from an otherwise silent statute.14 1
These questions are:
1) Whether the plaintiff belongs to a class for whose particular ben-
efit the statute was enacted;
2) Whether the legislature evidenced an intent either to confer or
to deny a private cause of action in a civil case;
3) Whether implication of the cause of action would necessarily
serve to further the statutory purpose and be consistent with the
statutory scheme;
4) Whether the implied cause of action would intrude into the do-
main exclusively reserved for either the federal government or a
state administrative agency.14
2
2. Oklahoma Decisional Law
The Oklahoma Supreme Court first addressed the issue of an im-
plied statutory cause of action in the context of the Unfair Claim Set-
tlement Practices Act' 43 and subsequently revisited the issue in the
context of the Claims Resolution Act."4 In Walker v. Chouteau Lime
Co.,14 the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
a private cause of action arose against an insurer who violated title 36
138. Id.
139. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452, 456 (Cal. 1979).
140. VALL, supra note 7, § 9.15, at 415.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 415-16.
143. OK A STAT. tit. 36, §§ 1221 - 1228 (1991) (renumbered as OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 1250.1
- .16 (Supp. 1994)).
144. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 1251 - 1260 (1991) (renumbered as OKa.A. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 1250.2
- .16 (Supp. 1994)).
145. 849 P.2d 1085 (Okla. 1993).
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section 1222146 of the Unfair Claims Settlement Act. The court used a
three-pronged test to determine whether an implied cause of action
might arise from a state regulatory statute. Consideration was given
to whether: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a class for whom the statute
was enacted rather than the public at large, (2) the statute either ex-
plicitly or implicitly gives some indication of legislative intent to cre-
ate or deny a private remedy, and (3) recognition of a private remedy
would be inconsistent with the purpose of the legislation. 147 Analysis
of these considerations led the court in Chouteau to conclude that no
implied cause of action arose from a violation of the Act.148
In McWhirter v. Fire Insurance Exchange,149 the court addressed
this issue in the context of the Claims Resolution Act. Therein, the
court adopted the analysis used in Walker to support its negative re-
sponse.' 50 Oklahoma has clearly aligned itself with the majority of
jurisdictions in regards to the issue of whether a private cause of ac-
tion arises from an insurers breach of a regulatory statute. In addi-
tion, Walker demonstrates that Oklahoma courts utilize the
traditional analysis used in the majority of jurisdictions.
3. Oklahoma Express Statutory Law
The Oklahoma legislature has enacted a penalty for delay statute
which provides a cause of action when an insurance company delays
payment of a claim. 5' This statute is limited to claims involving acci-
dent and health insurance. 52 It treats the failure of an insurer to no-
tify a policyholder, in writing, of the cause for delay in payment of a
claim as an unfair trade practice. 53 The required notification must be
mailed, return receipt requested, within thirty days after receipt of the
claim. 4 Failure to provide the statutorily required notice constitutes
prima facie evidence that the claim will be paid in accordance with the
policy.' 55 Furthermore, when an accident and health insurance pro-
vider fails to pay a claim within sixty days after proof of loss the in-
sured is entitled to recover the policy proceeds plus interest based on
146. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1222 (1981) (repealed by 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 342 § 21).
147. Walker, 849 P.2d at 1086-87.
148. Id. at 1087. See also Gianfifippo v. Northland Casualty Co., 861 P.2d 308, 310 (Okla,
1993).
149. 878 P.2d 1056 (Okla. 1994).
150. Id. at 1057-58.
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the rate of the average United States Treasury Bill, plus two percent-
age points.
The delay in payment statute also provides that in the event of
litigation based upon such a claim, the prevailing party is entitled to a
reasonable attorney's fee.'56 The American Rule, which is followed in
a substantial majority of jurisdictions including Oklahoma, states that
in the absence of a contract or statute attorney's fees cannot be recov-
ered by the prevailing party. 5 7 The Oklahoma legislature has, how-
ever, declared that:
Upon a judgment rendered to either party, costs and attorney fees
shall be allowable to the prevailing party. For purposes of this sec-
tion, the prevailing party is the insurer in those cases where judg-
ment does not exceed written offer of settlement. In all other
judgments the insured shall be the prevailing party. If the insured is
the prevailing party, the court in rendering judgment shall add inter-
est on the verdict at the rate of fifteen percent (15%) per year from
the date the loss was payable pursuant to the provisions of the con-
tract to the date of the verdict. This provision shall not apply to
uninsured motorist coverage.'58
This provision has been judicially construed to mean that attorney's
fees are recoverable in all actions involving insurance contracts unless
specifically proscribed elsewhere.' 5 9
C. Fraud
The intentional tort of fraud or misrepresentation may also be
alleged in conjunction with a bad faith action for failure to pay a first-
party claim. There are four types of fraud actions: (1) common law
fraud, (2) constructive fraud, (3) post-application fraud, and (4) fraud-
ulent breach of contract.
1. Common Law Fraud
The elements of a common-law action for fraud are: (1) a mate-
rial misrepresentation, (2) that is knowingly or recklessly made, (3)
with intent that it be relied upon, and (4) injury to the party relying
156. § 1219(d). See also Cox v. American Fidelity Assurance Co., 581 P.2d 1325,1326 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1978) (holding that prevailing party was entitled to reasonable attorney's fee).
157. Holbert v. Echeverria, 744 P.2d 960, 965 (Okla. 1987).
158. Ogi.. STAT. tit 36, § 3629(B) (1991).
159. Alsobrook v. National Travelers Life Ins. Co., 852 P.2d 768, 773-74 (Okla. Ct. App.
1992); City Nat'l Bank v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins., 804 P.2d 463, 469 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990). See
also Oliver's Sports Ctr., Inc. v. National Standard Ins. Co., 615 P.2d 291 (Okla. 1980) (attorney's
fees recovered in a bad faith insurance case).
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upon the false statement. 160  The circumstances constituting fraud
must be stated with particularity. 16  This particularity requires specifi-
cation of the time, place, and content of an alleged false representa-
tion, but not the circumstances or evidence from which a state of mind
can be inferred.162
An action based on fraud is especially difficult to satisfy because
circumstantial evidence cannot be relied upon to create a presumption
of fraud. Rather, proof of fraud must be made with clear and convinc-
ing evidence. 63 Furthermore, an insured may not rely upon false
statements the truth of which could have been ascertained with rea-
sonable diligence."6 Another difficulty with fraud actions is that the
fraudulent conduct complained of ordinarily takes place during the
application phase of the process. Consequently, an insurer's post-
claim conduct is typically not relevant.
2. Constructive Fraud
In addition to recognizing common law fraud, Oklahoma also
recognizes a related doctrine known as constructive fraud. Unlike ac-
tual fraud, constructive fraud does not require an intent to deceive. 165
Constructive fraud consists of:
1) In any breach of duty which, without an actually fraudulent in-
tent, gains an advantage to the person in fault, or any one claiming
under him, by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the preju-
dice of any one claiming under him; or,
2) In any act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudu-
lent, without respect to actual fraud. "66
In the insurance context, constructive fraud is ordinarily applied
where the agent of the insurer and the insured mutually understood
160. Dawson v. Tindell, 733 P.2d 407,408 (Okla. 1987); D&H Co. v. Shultz, 579 P.2d 821,824(Okla. 1978); Ramsey v. Fowler, 308 P.2d 654, 656 (Okla. 1957); Wingate v. Render, 160 P. 614,
617 (Okla. 1916).
161. OKLA. STAT. tit 12, § 2009(B) (1991).
162. § 2009 (B), (F); Gay v. Akin, 766 P.2d 985, 990 (Okla. 1988).
163. See, e.g., Tice v. Tice, 672 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Okla. 1983); Barriner v. Stedman, 580 P.2d
514, 516 (Okla. 1978); Skelly Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 82 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Okla. 1938).
164. Silver v. Slusher, 770 P.2d 878, 881 n.8 (Okla. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989).
See Onstott v. Osborne, 417 P.2d 291, 293 (Okla. 1966); Nowka v. west, 186 P. 220, 223 (Okla.
1919).
165. Faulkenberry v. Kansas City S. R.R. Co., 602 P.2d 203, 206 fn.6 (Okla. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 850 (1983) ("Liability for constructive fraud may be based on a negligent misrep-
resentation. Even an innocent misrepresentation may constitute constructive fraud where there
is an underlying right to be correctly informed of the facts.") (citing Steele v. Steele, 295 F. Supp.
1266,1269 (D.C. W.Va. 1969)). See also Gentry v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 867 P.2d 468,471
(Okla. 1994).
166. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 59 (1991).
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the specific nature, object, or purpose for which the insured sought
coverage. 167 The state of mind required for constructive fraud will not
support a punitive damages award. Nevertheless, the insured may re-
cover actual and consequential damages, plus attorney's fees. 6 8 Ad-
ditionally, the insured in a constructive fraud case may also have the
policy reformed to include the initially agreed upon coverage. 169
3. Post-Application Fraud
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
whether fraud is a viable theory for post-application conduct on the
part of an insurer. Such a case might arise where the insurer's agent,
after a loss has occurred but prior to filing the claim, communicates to
the insured an improper procedure for filing the claim. 70 For exam-
ple, where the agent informs the insured that no proof of loss state-
ment is necessary to recover on the policy or that the insured need
take no further action to protect its rights to the proceeds under the
policy. Insured follows the agent's suggestions to its detriment, and
the insurer subsequently denies coverage because of the insured's fail-
ure to adhere to conditions precedent set out in the policy. Whether
such conduct constitutes fraud depends upon the state of mind of the
agent at the time the statements were made. If the agent negligently
or innocently misleads the insured, constructive fraud, rather than ac-
tual fraud, would be the appropriate cause of action.
4. Fraudulent Breach of Contract
The Supreme Court of South Carolina developed a novel ap-
proach to fraud in Welborn v. Dixon. 17 1 Therein, the court recognized
that an award of exemplary damages was proper in an action arising
out of breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. 72 This
action is commonly referred to as fraudulent breach of contract and
has been applied by South Carolina courts to breaches of insurance
contracts. 73 An action for fraudulent breach of contract requires
167. See e.g., Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Callaway, 134 F.2d 788, 709-91 (10th Cir. 1943);
Pacific Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Smith Bros. Drilling Co., 162 P.2d 871, 873 (Okla. 1945).
168. Gentry, 867 P.2d at 474.
169. Id. at 472.
170. See, e.g., Medtech Corp. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 555 N.E.2d 844, 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
171. 49 S.E. 232 (S.C. 1904).
172. Id. at 234.
173. See Wright v. Public Say. Life Ins. Co., 204 S.E.2d 57, 59 (S.C. 1974).
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proof that the breach of contract was committed with fraudulent in-
tent and accompanied by a fraudulent act.174 This action differs from
an ordinary common law fraud action based on false statements in
that punitive damages have been awarded even though the conduct
complained of occurred after the issuance of the policy.175
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma would enter-
tain an action for fraudulent breach of contract because Oklahoma
law has long recognized that punitive damages are not recoverable in
a breach of contract action unless the breach of contract constitutes an
independent tort. 76 Under this rule, the award of exemplary damages
is grounded in the tort action and not the breach of contract. Further-
more, fraudulent breach of contract adds nothing to the law not al-
ready provided by tort actions for actual and constructive fraud.
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
1. Determination of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress
Recovery of damages for mental and emotional distress outside
the scope of some traditionally recognized torts such as assault, bat-
tery and false imprisonment is relatively new.17 7 Generally states that
have adopted the new tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress have followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 46.178
This section sets forth the elements of the tort as follows: "[o]ne who
by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for
such bodily harm. '1 79 Thus, the right to recover damages for mental
and emotional injury is no longer dependent upon there having been a
physical injury to the plaintiff.'80
Damages for mental or emotional injury may be recovered para-
sitically as an element of the bad faith claim, or in a separate in-
dependent tort action.'' Where emotional distress is asserted as an
174. Id. at 59.
175. See e.g., Corley v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 135 S.E.2d 316, 319 (S.C. 1964).
176. See Storck v. Cities Service Gas Co., 634 P.2d 1319, 1323 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981); Z.D.
Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345, 347 (Okla. 1975).
177. Williams v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 688 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Okla. 1984).
178. See Dean v. Chapman, 556 P.2d 257, 261 (Okla. 1976).
179. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
180. See Dean, 556 P.2d at 261.
181. KEErON Er. AL, supra note 30, § 12, at 57.
[Vol. 31:57
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element of damages it is unnecessary to prove that the insurer's con-
duct was extreme and outrageous."8 Otherwise, liability for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress can be "found only where the
conduct has been so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency."1 8 3
Whether the conduct was extreme and outrageous is initially a
question of law for the court to determine." If reasonable minds
might differ on whether the conduct was extreme and outrageous, the
issue becomes a question of fact for the jury to resolve. 8 5 Following
an affirmative finding that the conduct was extreme and outrageous,
the jury has to determine whether severe emotional distress exists.18 6
The severity of the emotional distress is not only relevant to the
amount of recovery but is also a necessary element to any recovery. 87
The relationship between the parties is important in determining
whether liability should be imposed for emotional distress. 88 Fur-
thermore, the common law places upon public utilities, and other en-
terprises that affect the public interest, a special duty to refrain from
interfering with the emotional tranquility of a consumer. 9 Liability
for breach of this limited duty exists even in the absence of outrageous
conduct. 90
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Applied to
Insurance Contracts
Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.'9' is one of the
leading intentional infliction of emotional distress cases arising in the
insurance context. This is due largely to the fact that the insured in
Fletcher asserted intentional infliction of emotional distress as the sole
theory of recovery. In Fletcher, Western National wrongfully refused
182. Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 916 (Okla. 1982).
183. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) of TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
184. Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74,76 (Okla. 1986); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46
cmts. h & j (1965).
185. Eddy, 715 P.2d at 76; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmnts. h & j (1965).
186. Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346,1353-54 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nora. Tay-
lor v. Howard, 459 U.S. 1147, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1249
(1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965).
188. Id. at cmt. d; id. at § 48; KEETON ET. t., supra note 30, § 12, at 58.
189. RESTATE1ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 48 (1965).
190. Id.
191. 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (cited with approval by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977)).
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to pay the insured approximately $50,000 due under a disability insur-
ance policy by contending intermittently that the disability resulted
from a preexisting injury which plaintiff misrepresented in the applica-
tion for insurance, or that plaintiff's injury was the result of a sickness
for which only two years of benefits were provided, rather than an
injury for which up to thirty years was provided. 19 The court in
Fletcher noted that the plaintiff, in order to recover for emotional dis-
tress, had to prove that the defendant's conduct was outrageous 193 and
that plaintiff suffered "severe" emotional distress. The court defined
severe emotional distress as distress that is "of such substantial quan-
tity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society
should be expected to endure it."' 94 Additionally, the court consid-
ered the intensity and duration of the distress in determining
severity.195
Western National acknowledged the outrageousness of its con-
duct;196 in doing so, it probably considered the evidence that it had
actual knowledge of (1) the cause of plaintiff's injury, (2) the extent of
plaintiff's injury, (3) the uniformity of the numerous medical conclu-
sions that insured was disabled as a result the injury, and (4) conduct
of its claim supervisor in attempting to minimize or avoid paying the
plaintiff.197 As a result of the claim supervisor's wrongful refusal to
pay, the plaintiff's family was forced to do without food and cloth-
ing.198 The insured was unable to make his house payments and was
forced to pay late charges and delinquency fees. 99 In addition, in-
sured lost a real estate investment as a result of his inability to make
payments on the property.20 0 His utilities were disconnected at vari-
ous times. 201 Finally, the plaintiff's wife had to return to work and his
daughter was required to stay out of school to care for the plaintiff.20 2
All these facts were known by Western National which continued,
over a period of nearly five years, to attempt to force plaintiff to
forego the proceeds under the policy.20 3 One can infer, from the
192. Id. at 80-81.
193. Id
194. Id. at 90.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 88-89.
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court's acknowledgment of defendant's admission,2 4 that a court ac-
tually faced with a determination of whether such conduct was outra-
geous would probably answer in the affirmative.
The fact patterns of cases in which plaintiffs have successfully re-
covered damages for emotional distress in first-party insurance cases
are strikingly similar. These patterns uniformly involve a wrongful de-
nial of policy proceeds which causes the insured to suffer a combina-
tion of severe economic consequences such as going without food,
clothing, shelter or necessary medical attention.2 "5 In addition, the
existence of specific knowledge on the part of the insurer with regards
to the impecunious conditions of its insured, and the tenuousness of
its reason for denying the proceeds combined with bullying conduct
operate to elevate the insurer's conduct to the level of outrageousness
necessary to justify an award for emotional distress. 20 6
Although intentional infliction of emotional distress provides a
theoretical foundation for recovery in tort for breach of an insurance
contract, it is not an ideal remedy for such practices. This is due
mainly to the fact that liability for emotional distress "does not extend
to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or
trivialities.... [P]laintiffs must necessarily be expected and required
to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occa-
sional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind."20 7 The diffi-
culty of proving outrageousness and severity substantially lessens the
appeal of an emotional distress action as an extracontractual remedy
for breach of an insurance contract.
E. Tortious Interference With Property
The court in Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.
noted that:
[I]ndependent of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, such conduct on the part of a disability insurer constitutes a
tortious interference with a protected property interest of its in-
sured for which damages may be recovered to compensate for all
detriment proximately resulting therefrom, including economic loss
204. Id. at 89.
205. See, e.g., Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1108 (Cal. 1974); Fletcher v.
Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 88 (Cal. Ct. App.); Amsden v. Grinnell Mut. Rein-
surance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1972).
206. Fletcher, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
207. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). The tort of outrage protects
emotional tranquility against serious invasions only. Id. Extraordinary transgression of the
bounds of civility is required. Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 77 n.6 (Okla. 1986).
1995]
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as well as emotional distress resulting from the conduct or from the
economic losses caused by the conduct, and, in a proper case, puni-
tive damages.20 8
Under the theory of tortious interference with property, neither proof
that the conduct of the insurer was outrageous nor that severe emo-
tional distress resulted is required to recover damages for emotional
distress.20 9 Likewise, other elements of damages such as economic
loss are recoverable.210
Tortious interference with property is analogous to the action for
conversion.211 Conversion is concerned with substantial interference
with property or with an individual's rights therein. 1 2 In determining
the seriousness of the interference and whether liability should be im-
posed on the defendant, consideration of "the extent and duration of
the defendant's exercise of control over the chattel; his intent to assert
a right which is in fact inconsistent with the plaintiff's right of control;
the defendant's good faith or bad intentions; the extent and duration
of the resulting interference with the plaintiff's right of control; the
harm done to the chattel; and the expense and inconvenience caused
to the plaintiff. '213 Originally intangible rights could not be con-
verted; however, this rule has been relaxed and rights themselves may
be converted even in the absence of the conversion of something
tangible.214
Conversion occurs only when the defendant intentionally affects
plaintiff's property or rights therein. This level of culpability does not
necessarily require conscious wrongdoing. 1 5 Instead, intent to exer-
cise dominion or control over the property that substantially interferes
with plaintiff's right therein is enough to satisfy the culpability re-
quirement.216 In the insurance context the insured's claim is based on
wrongfully withholding possession of the policy proceeds. In order to
prevail on this theory the insured must show that a demand was made
and he is entitled to the proceeds.217
208. Fletcher, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
209. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1042 (Cal. 1972).
210. Fletcher, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
211. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. King, 287 S.E.2d 381, 383 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981).
212. KEroN ET. AL, supra note 30, § 15, at 90.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 91.
215. Id. at 92.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 99.
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Tortious interference with a protected property interest has re-
ceived scant judicial attention in the insurance context. 218 This is
probably due to the fact that this action "has apparently not been used
extensively in subsequent cases. '219 Rather, the preferred extracon-
tractual remedy for improper insurance claims practices seems to be
breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
V. CONCLUSION
Conduct which once constituted a breach of contract may now be
classified as a tort as well. The corresponding right to compensatory
and punitive damages for breach of an insurance contract is simply the
method used to achieve the objectives of fully compensating the in-
sured and deterring insurers from willfully failing, without proper
cause, to settle claims with their insureds. Determining whether a
case is one for extracontractual remedies is really a matter of common
sense; this determination can be made by merely ascertaining whether
the insured has been treated fairly and reasonably. If not, an action
for compensatory damages would probably be proper. Punitive dam-
ages, however, are another matter. The insurer's conduct, in order to
justify a punitive award, must have been egregious. This does not,
however, require the conduct to have been outrageous in the literal
sense of the word.
Three levels of proof can be identified in every bad faith case.
There are also three distinct measures of damages, each correspond-
ing to the specific level of proof placed into evidence. The first level
pertains to breach of contract actions. An erroneous denial of bene-
fits alone entitles the insured to the policy proceeds plus interest. The
second level of proof requires evidence of bad faith. An unreasona-
ble, improper denial of benefits constitutes a breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing for which consequential damages are re-
coverable. The third level of proof requires evidence of wanton,
gross, malicious, or reckless conduct on the part of the insurer. It is
only evidence of this nature that will support a punitive award.
The actions of agents and company employees can bind an insur-
ance company for purposes of contract and compensatory awards.
218. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032,1041 (Cal. 1973); Christian v. American
Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899,902 (Okla. 1977); KEETON ET AL, supra note 30, § 15, at 99.
This cause of action is uniformly recognized in jurisdictions which follow Gruenberg, however,
no court has elaborated on the primafacie requirements of tortious interference with a protected
property interest. Rather, most courts cite to Fletcher for legal support of the tort.
219. SERmNO'F ET AT, supra note 23, § 1.06, at 1-29.
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The same conclusion is true with regards to punitive damages. The
legal malice of an agent or employee is treated, in Oklahoma, as the
legal malice of the corporation."2 This rule has not, however, been
applied to insurance companies. In contrast, California adheres to the
view that a corporation is not responsible for punitive damages be-
cause of the actions of its employees or agents unless:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act; (b)
the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him;
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting
in the scope of employment, or (d) the principal or managerial
agent of the [corporation] ratified or approved the act.22'
Under this approach it is necessary to establish ratification or to
demonstrate that the employee or agent possessed sufficient manage-
rial authority to bind the insurance company. This determination:
[D]oes not necessarily hinge on their "level" in the corporate hier-
archy. Rather, the critical inquiry is the degree of discretion the
employees possess in making decisions that will ultimately deter-
mine corporate policy. When employees dispose of insureds' claims
with little if any supervision, they possess sufficient discretion for
the law to impute their actions concerning those claims to the
corporation.2=
The availability of punitive damages in extracontractual actions
has given extracontractual remedies bite. It is this aspect of extracon-
tractual remedies which is revolutionary. "Insurers view this develop-
ment [the availability of punitive awards] as if it were some sort of
plague. Insureds see it as an 'equalizing club' with which to battle the
insurance carrier which is supposed to be the insured's benefactor but
is too often his antagonist." 23
Oklahoma's law of bad faith is quite liberal and overwhelmingly
favors the insured. However, in most instances insurance companies
can avoid liability for bad faith by diligently training claims personnel
and establishing and enforcing uniform procedures for handling
claims. These procedures should prescribe the manner in which every
220. Mayo Hotel Co. v. Danciger, 288 P. 309, 311 (Okla. 1930); Dill v. Rader, 533 P.2d 650,
655-56 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
221. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452,459 (Cal. 1979) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973) § 909).
222. Id.
223. Arnold R. Levinson, Thoughts on Trying a Plaintiffs Extracontractual Damages Case, in
ExrRACONTRACrUAL DAMAGES 139, 141 (John R. Groves ed., 1983).
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claim is to be handled." 4 Adherence to a uniform procedure, how-
ever, does not necessarily guarantee that fewer bad faith actions will
be filed. Rather, the procedures may merely lessen the likelihood of
success at trial. Uniform procedures may encourage the filing of a
lawsuit in which the plaintiff's counsel engages in vigorous discovery
to demonstrate that: (1) qompany personnel did not follow the pro-
scribed procedure at all times in handling the claim in issue, or (2) the
claim should have been handled in another manner because of unique
224. It has been suggested that the procedure for handling claims include the following rules
of conduct:
1. Investigate every claim promptly, carefully, and with an open mind. Do not hesitate
to employ outside investigators and other experts where such expertise is needed.
2. To avoid delay, efforts to determine the amount of loss should proceed simultane-
ously with the liability investigation.
3. Adjusters and claim representatives should be instructed to, at all times, treat the
insured with courtesy.
4. Adjusters' and investigators' reports, and all internal company memoranda relating
to the claim, should stick to the facts, be precise as to the sources of any opinions and
conclusions, and be devoid of any derogatory comments about the insured.
5. Make certain that, before any decision is made to deny liability, the results of the
investigation have been carefully and objectively reviewed by a claims supervisor.
6. Particularly in complex matters, such as those involving potential arson and fraud
defenses or novel questions of policy interpretation, the file should be reviewed by
outside legal counsel before liability is denied. (Remember also: In many jurisdictions
acting on advice of counsel negates the existence of malice.)
7. Respond in writing to all letters from the insured and his counsel.
8. All communications from the insured should be responded to promptly, and all com-
munications to the insured should be courteous in tone. If you are waiting for a report
or evaluation from outside counsel or other expert, so advise the insured.
9. Whenever you write to an insured (or his attorney), consider how the letter would
sound if some day read to a jury.
10. If an insured asks for blank proof-of-loss or claim forms, send them; if the insured
asks for an extension of time in which to file proof of loss or submit other information
that has been requested, grant the request; if an insured asks for a copy of any state-
ments given to the adjuster, or for a copy of the transcript given of his examination, or
independent medical examination, provide it.
11. All request to the insured for additional information should, whenever possible, be
in writing, and the insured should be given every opportunity to comply with such
requests.
12. Avoid telling insured that he will be hearing from you in a specified time, unless
you are absolutely certain that you will be able to comply with such a commitment.
13. Don't make any "low ball" settlement offers. When the issue is solely amount,
offer the full sum that you believe to be owing under the policy.
14. If a decision is made to deny liability, be prompt in so advising the insured. Do not
keep such a decision secret while insisting that the insured furnish additional data and
submit to examination.
15. Explain to insured the reasons for denial ....
17. If the only matter in dispute is the amount which the insured is entitled to recover
under the policy, be willing to make payment to the insured of the amount not in
dispute.
18. If the insured is caught in a controversy between two or more insurers as to the
amount owed by each, make a diligent effort to work out an arrangement whereby the
amount of the loss is paid to the insured, with the companies reserving the right to
resolve their dispute by arbitration or litigation.
McCarthy, supra note 1, at 89-90.
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circumstances, or (3) this claim would not have been handled the
same way again by the defendant insurance company or another in-
surance company under shifilar circumstances, or (4) there was addi-
tional information which was readily available that the company did
not have at the time it made its decision to deny. Despite their short-
comings, uniform handling procedures combined with strict company
policies that limit the authority of the claim representatives to unilat-
erally deny benefits should provide insurance companies with an ad-
ded level of protection.
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